Contributions in Merlin

Preference reversals occur when different (but formally equivalent) elicitation methodsnreveal conflicting preferences over two alternatives. This paper shows that when people have fuzzy preferences i.e. when they choose in a probabilistic manner, their observed decisions can generate systematic preference reversals. A simple model of probabilistic choice and valuation can account for a higher incidence of standard (nonstandard) preference reversals for certainty (probability) equivalents and it can also rationalize the existence of strong reversals. An important methodological contribution of the paper is a new definition of a probabilistic certainty/probability equivalent of a risky lottery.

"Consider the problem of testing s hypotheses simultaneously. In this paper, we derive methods which control the generalized familywise error rate given by the probability of k or more false rejections, abbreviated k-FWER. We derive both single-step and stepdown procedures that control the k-FWER in finite samples or asymptotically, depending on the situation. Moreover, the procedures are asymptotically balanced in an appropriate sense. We briefly consider control of the average number of false rejections. Additionally, we considernthe false discovery proportion (FDP), defined as the number of false rejections divided by the total number of rejections (and defined to be 0 if there are no rejections). Here, the goal is to construct methods which satisfy, for given γ and α, P{FDP > γ} ≤ α, at least asymptotically. Special attention attention is paid to the construction of methods which implicitly take into account the dependence structure of the individual test statistics in ordernto further increase the ability to detect false null hypotheses. A general resampling and subsampling approach is presented which achieves these objectives, at least asymptotically."

We argue that, in a simple setting, the relation between the intensity of competition and cost-reducing investment is U-shaped. We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated Cournot duopoly. We first show that, except for firms that are much less efficient than the competitor, investment in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is minimal for intermediate levels of competition, which is inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation. An extensive set of laboratory experiments also provides support for the U-shape, both for symmetric firms and for leaders. Also consistent with predictions, the relation is negative for firms that are lagging behind.

We present a theoretical basis for testing related endpoints. Typically, it is known hownto construct tests of the individual hypotheses, and the problem is how to combine them into a multiple test procedure that controls the familywise error rate. Using the closure method, we emphasize the role of consonant procedures, from an interpretive as well as a theoretical viewpoint. Suprisingly, even if each intersection test has an optimality property, the overallnprocedure obtained by applying closure to these tests may be inadmissible. We introduce annew procedure, which is consonant and has a maximin property under the normal model. The results are then applied to PROactive, a clinical trial designed to investigate the effectivenessnof a glucose-lowering drug on macrovascular outcomes among patients with type 2 diabetes.n

To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted an experiment in which subjects were able to delegate the choice between a fair or unfair allocation, and used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this constitutes a powerful motive for the delegation of a decision right.nFurthermore, we propose a formal measure of responsibility and show thatnthis measure outperforms measures based on outcome or intention in predicting punishment behavior.

Loss aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of loss aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they may choose in a probabilistic manner. The implications of loss aversion are discussed for expected utility theory and rankdependentnutility theory as well as for popular models of probabilistic choice such as the constant error/tremble model and a strong utility model (that includes the Fechner model of random errors and Luce choice model as special cases).

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own e?ort and negatively on the e?ort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-stage game with investment preceding homogenous Bertrand competition. We obtain overinvestment both relative to the mixed-strategy equilibrium and the social optimum.

The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms’ incentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out experiments based on two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments. However, a positive effect is observed for a switch from Cournot to Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case.

The experimental literature and studies using survey data have established that people care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely, as standard economic theory assumes, about their absolute economic position. Individuals are concerned about social comparisons. However, behavioral evidence in the field is rare. This paper provides an empirical analysis testing the model of inequity aversion using two unique panel data sets for basketball and soccer players. We find support that the concept of inequity aversion helps to understand how the relative income situation affects performance in a real competitive environment with real tasks and real incentives.

We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either envious or selfish best explains the punishment from both third and second parties. Third and second parties punish richer co-players, even if they chose a socially or Pareto-efficient allocation or if they are merely bystanders who made no choice. Despite their unaffected position, we do not find that third parties punish in a more impartial or normativenmanner.