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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 373 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2008 |
Abstract Text | We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either envious or selfish best explains the punishment from both third and second parties. Third and second parties punish richer co-players, even if they chose a socially or Pareto-efficient allocation or if they are merely bystanders who made no choice. Despite their unaffected position, we do not find that third parties punish in a more impartial or normativenmanner. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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