Contributions in Merlin

Code review consists of manual inspection, discussion, and judgment of source code by developers other than the code's author. Due to discussions around competing ideas and group decision-making processes, interpersonal conflicts during code reviews are expected. This study systematically investigates how developers perceive code review conflicts and addresses interpersonal conflicts during code reviews as a theoretical construct. Through the thematic analysis of interviews conducted with 22 developers, we confirm that conflicts during code reviews are commonplace, anticipated and seen as normal by developers. Even though conflicts do happen and carry a negative impact for the review, conflicts-if resolved constructively-can also create value and bring improvement. Moreover, the analysis provided insights on how strongly conflicts during code review and its context (i.e., code, developer, team, organization) are intertwined. Finally, there are aspects specific to code review conflicts that call for the research and application of customized conflict resolution and management techniques, some of which are discussed in this paper. Data and material: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5848794

We document the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on digital finance and fintech adoption. Drawing on mobile application data from a globally representative sample, we find that the spread of COVID- 19 and related government lockdowns led to a sizeable increase in the rate of finance app downloads. We then analyze factors that may have driven this effect on the demand-side and better understand the “winners” from this digital acceleration on the supply-side. Our overall results suggest that traditional incumbents saw the largest growth in their digital offerings during the initial period, but that "BigTech" companies and newer fintech providers ultimately outperformed them over time. Finally, we drill-down further on the adoption of fintech apps pertaining to both the asset and liability side of the traditional bank balance sheet, to explore the implications that the accelerated trends in digitization may have for the future landscape of financial intermediation.

The present article studies geometric step options in exponential Lévy markets. Our contribution is manifold and extends several aspects of the geometric step option pricing literature. First, we provide symmetry and duality relations and derive various characterizations for both European-type and American-type geometric double barrier step options. In particular, we are able to obtain a jump-diffusion disentanglement for the early exercise premium of American-type geometric double barrier step contracts and its maturity-randomized equivalent as well as to characterize the diffusion and jump contributions to these early exercise premiums separately by means of partial integro-differential equations and ordinary integro-differential equations. As an application of our characterizations, we derive semi-analytical pricing results for (regular) European-type and American-type geometric down-and-out step call options under hyper-exponential jump-diffusion models. Lastly, we use the latter results to discuss the early exercise structure of geometric step options once jumps are added and to subsequently provide an analysis of the impact of jumps on the price and hedging parameters of (European-type and American-type) geometric step contracts.

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In this paper, we gauge the degree of interconnectedness and quantify the linkages between global and other systemically important institutions, and the global financial system. We document that the two groups and the financial system become more interconnected during the global financial crisis when linkages across groups grow. In contrast, during tranquil times linkages within groups prevail. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) contribute most to system-wide distress but are also most exposed. There are more links coming from G-SIBs to other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) than the other way around, confirming the role of G-SIBs as major risk transmitters in the financial system. The two groups and the global financial system tend to co-vary for periods up to 60 days Prior to their official designation as G-SIBs or O-SIIs, the prevalent news sentiment about these institutions (we measure with a textual analysis) was negative. Importantly, the systemic importance and exposure of G-SIBs and O-SIIs is perceived differently by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA).

Small and micro enterprises are usually majority owned by entrepreneurs. Using a unique sample of loan applications from such firms, we study the role of owners’ gender in the credit decision of banks and the post-credit decision firm outcomes. We find that, ceteris paribus, female entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants, with both the probabilities to apply for credit and of firm default after the loan origination being smaller. However, the relatively more aggressive behavior of male applicants pays off in terms of higher average firm performance after the loan origination.

Are firms that are managed and owned by females-only appraised differently than those where genders mix at the top? To answer this question, we study 7,467 small and medium-sized firms from 22 countries. We find that – when borrowing from banks – firms that are both managed and owned by females more often report binding credit constraints and higher interest rate payments than male-only firms; differences that we can attribute to taste-based discrimination. In contrast, if the manager and the owner have a different gender, we find no such differences with male-only firms. Hence, interestingly banks seem to assume that women invariably play second fiddle in the mixed-gender firms. We also show that discrimination between female-only and other firms disappears from economically more developed regions and from credit markets that are more competitive or dominated by transactional lenders.

Corruption is ubiquitous in practice and has severe negative consequences for organizations and societies at large. Drawing on a laboratory experiment, we propose that individuals high in moral commitment are less likely to engage in corrupt behaviors and prefer foregoing financial benefits. Specifically, we posit that individuals refrain from corruption (i) the more they endorse integrity (incorruptibility) as a protected value and (ii) the higher their level of Honesty-Humility. The results of a two-step experiment largely support our expectations: people who treat compromises to integrity as unacceptable were less willing to accept bribes, and Honesty-Humility decreased bribe-giving. The findings are robust to demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, cultural background) and additional personal characteristics (e.g., risk tolerance, dispositional greed) and have important implications for ongoing theory-building efforts and business practice.

Was bedeutet Inflation? Ist sie gefährlich? Und was bedeutet sie für Anlegerinnen und Anleger? Interview mit Thorsten Hens, UZH-Professor für Finanzmarktökonomie.