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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Organization Unit	Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, and Environmental Economics (Armin Schmutzler)
Authors	Dario Sacco Armin Schmutzler
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Number	No. 806
Date	2008
Abstract Text	The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own e?ort and negatively on the e?ort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-stage game with investment preceding homogenous Bertrand competition. We obtain overinvestment both relative to the mixed-strategy equilibrium and the social optimum.
Official URL	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html
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