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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| Number | No. 365 |
| ISSN | 1424-0459 |
| Date | 2008 |
| Abstract Text | We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents,nwhere monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, ornbargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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