Contributions in Merlin

An agent can choose to forego bene ts from side opportunities and to instead provide bene ts to the principal. In return, the principal o¤ers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agents productivity in contractible and possibly also non-contractible actions inside the relationship to be correlated with productivity in side activities. This arguably realistic assumption yields several novel implications for the feasibility of relational contracts and for agent selection by principals. The analysis reveals, for example, that optimal agent productivity is often non-monotonic in the importance, to the principal, of ensuring agent reliability.

We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many management fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. Our research focuses on previous empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm performance on various different dates. Our results indicate that a variable CEO income contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that CEO salary and firm performance are not linked. The example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to solve.

Empirical investigations of analysts forecast surveys concerning earnings realizations find significant time varying biases usually attributed to the analysts liability to cognitive limitations. For example, a positive autocorrelation of analysts forecast errors is commonly explained by analysts underreaction. In this paper we develop a random dynamical system describing the evolution of analysts forecasts and firms prices and show that managerial guidance is capable to explain such inefficiencies in the analysts forecasting behavior. This result is well supported by empirical tests. In particular, we find that the managers of growth firms guide stronger than the managers of value firms, which allows further conclusions on the precision and efficiency of earnings forecasts released for value and growth stocks in line with the literature.

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This paper presents a simple model of the firm life cycle that captures several stylized economic and financial features which usually require considerably more demanding approaches. We study the optimal capital accumulation policy of a financially constrained firm whose revenue is subject to an additive shock. Earnings can be paid as dividends or reinvested with the goal to maximize shareholder value. In our model, the optimal policy of firms is to reinvest earnings (rather than paying dividends) when small, hold precautionary savings, and grow larger than is socially optimal. Smaller firms also have a higher bankruptcy risk and a more volatile market value than larger firms. We observe the leverage effect and excess returns of value stocks. In the presence of business cycles, investment and initial public offerings are pro-cyclical, the default probability is counter-cyclical, and monetary policy increases excess capital holdings but otherwise has a negligible impact.

Recent immigrants in Switzerland are overrepresented at the top of the wage distribution in high and at the bottom in low skill occupations. Basic economic theory thus suggests that immigration has led to a compression of the wage distribution in the former group and to an expansion in the latter. The data confirm this proposition for high skill occupations, but reveal effects close to zero for low skill occupations. While the estimated wage effects are of considerable magnitude at the tails of the wage distribution in high skill occupations, the effects on overall inequality are shown to be negligible.

This paper addresses the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks compete on both deposit and loan markets and where banks can use monitoring technology to control entrepreneurs' behavior, we investigate three questions: what are the effects of competition on banks' monitoring incentives? Does competition hurt banks' stability? What can be devices to correct potential negative effects of competition vis à vis financial stability? We find that impacts of competition on banks' monitoring incentives can be decomposed into two effects: one on the attractiveness of monitoring and the other on the monitoring efficiency. The first effect operates through the link between competition and loan margin. The second effect comes from the fact that marginal effect of monitoring on entrepreneur's effort depends on loan rate. We characterize the sufficient condition under which competition will increase monitoring incentives as well as banks' stability. For the third question, we focus on the role of capital requirement and claim that with capital requirement, we can attain a weak correction but not strong correction.

We construct and estimate a unified model combining three of the main sources of cross-country income disparities: differences in factor endowments, barriers to technology adoption and the inappropriateness of frontier technologies to local conditions. The key components are different types of workers, distortions to capital accumulation, directed technical change, costly adoption and spillovers from the world technology frontier. Despite its parsimonious parametrization, our empirical model provides a good fit of GDP data for up to 86 countries in 1970 and 122 countries in 2000. Removing barriers to technology adoption would increase the output per worker of the average non-OECD country relative to the US from 0.19 to 0.61, while increasing skill premia in all countries. Removing barriers to trade in goods amplifies income disparities, induces skill-biased technology adoption and increases skill premia in the majority of countries. These results are reverted if trade liberalization is coupled with international IPR protection.