H Egger, P Egger, On the relationship between international outsourcing and price-cost margins in European industries, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25 (1), 2004. (Journal Article)
This paper sets up a model, where multinationals compete in quantities and domestic firms form a competitive fringe. Within this framework, we analyse the relationship between market concentration, international outsourcing and the industry price-cost margin. The empirical results of a panel of 66 industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s strongly confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Market concentration and international outsourcing are positively related to industry price–cost margins. In a thought experiment, we show that industry price–cost margins would have decreased by 0.4 percentage points more in the 1990s, if international outsourcing had not changed since 1990. In addition, international outsourcing accounts for a convergence in margins across industries in the last decade. |
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S Buehler, J Haucap, Mobile number portability, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol. 4 (3), 2004. (Journal Article)
This paper examines the consequences of introducing mobile number portability (MNP). We show that if the sole effect of introducing MNP is the abolishment of switching costs, MNP unambiguously benefits mobile customers. However, if MNP also causes consumer ignorance, as telephone numbers no longer identify networks, mobile operators will increase termination charges, with ambiguous net effect on the surplus of mobile customers. We examine how extensions such as MNP based on call-forwarding, termination fee regulation, and alternative means of carrier identification affect these findings and discuss policy implications. |
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T Beissinger, H Egger, Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56 (3), 2004. (Journal Article)
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment. |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller, The Distribution of Money and Prices in an Equilibrium with Lotteries, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 174, 2004. (Working Paper)
We construct a tractable model of divisible money and equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible 'tokens'. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can generate monetary distributions that match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity. |
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Urs Fischbacher, Christina M Fong, Ernst Fehr, Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 133, 2003. (Working Paper)
One of the most basic questions in economics concerns the effects of competition onnmarket prices. We show that the neglect of both fairness concerns and decision errors prevents ansatisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices. We conducted experiments whichndemonstrate that the introduction of even a very small amount of competition to a bilateralnexchange situation - by adding just one competitor - induces large behavioral changes amongnbuyers and sellers, causing large changes in market prices. Models that assume that all people arenself-interested and fully rational fail to explain these changes satisfactorily. In contrast, a modelnthat combines heterogeneous fairness concerns with decision errors predicts all comparative staticneffects of changes in competition correctly. Moreover, the combined model enables us to predictnthe entire distribution of prices in many different competitive situations remarkably well. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, How Did the German Health Care Reform of 1997 Change the Distribution of the Demand for Health Services?, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 314, 2003. (Working Paper)
I consider the problem of evaluating the effect of a health care reform on the demand for doctor visits when the effect is potentially different in different parts of the outcome distribution. Quantile regression is a useful technique for studying such heterogeneous treatment effects. Recent progree has been made to extend such methods to applications with a count dependent variable. An analysis of a 1997 health care reform in Germany shows the benefit of the approach: lower quantiles, such as the 25 percent quantile, fell by substantially larger amounts than what would have been predicted based on Poisson or negative binomial models. |
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Alois Stutzer, Rafael Lalive, The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching and Subjective Well-Being, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 51, 2003. (Working Paper)
Social norms are usually neglected in economics, because they are to anlarge extent enforced through non-market interactions and difficult to isolatenempirically. In this paper, we offer a direct measure of the social norm to work andnwe show that this norm has important economic effects. The stronger the norm, thenmore quickly unemployed people find a new job. This behavior can be explained bynutility differences, probably due to social pressure. Unemployed people arensignificantly less happy than employed people and their reduction in life satisfactionnis the larger, the stronger the norm is. |
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E Droste, M Kosfeld, M Voorneveld, Best-reply matching in games, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 46 (3), 2003. (Journal Article)
We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability. |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Yvan Lengwiler, Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 175, 2003. (Working Paper)
From a game theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to em-bellishnthe financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhancenperformance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dy-namicsnof both applications within the same model. We allow for het-erogenousnpopulations, such as highly talented versus more mediocrenathletes, or high quality managers versus less able colleagues. Inter-estingly,nfor some parameters, the replicator dynamics is character-izednby cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport,nand cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in somencases, high ability players are more likely to commit fraud than lownability types. |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Esther Brügger, Simon Lörtscher, On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 153, 2003. (Working Paper)
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the loser to blow the whistle. This extended game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which only a cheating loser accuses the winner of cheating and the controller tests the winner if and only if the winner is accused of cheating. Whistleblowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto-improvement if punishments for cheating are suffciently large. |
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Matthias Benz, Bruno Frey, The Value of Autonomy: Evidence from the Self-Employed in 23 Countries, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 173, 2003. (Working Paper)
"The self-employed are substantially more satisfied with their worknthan employed persons. We document this relationship for 23 countries andnshow that the higher job satisfaction can directly be attributed to thengreater autonomy that self-employed persons enjoy. ""Being your own boss""nseems to provide non-pecuniary benefits from work that point to thenexistence of procedural utility: autonomy is valued beyond outcomes as angood decision-making procedure. The results hold not only for WesternnEuropean, North American and former communist Eastern European countries,nbut largely also for countries with a non-western cultural background." |
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Alejandra Cattaneo, Rainer Winkelmann, Earnings Differentials between German and French Speakers in Switzerland, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 309, 2003. (Working Paper)
The paper analyses the effect of mother tongue on labor market outcomes of Swiss residents. This type of analysis can shed light on an important policy question. Is the Swiss labor market well integrated, or can one find instead segmentation along language borders? Improving on previous research in this area, we use a nationally representative household survey, the Swiss Household Panel 1999 and 2000, and we explicitly account for self-selection of workers into language areas. Overall, we find no evidence to suggest that the Swiss labor market is not perfectly integrated or that internal migrants are positively selected. |
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Bruno Frey, Simon Luechinger, Measuring Terrorism, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 171, 2003. (Working Paper)
Terrorism will be high on the political agenda for many years to come. Various policies are open to a government fighting terrorism but, in any case, considerable costs are involved. In the competition for politicalnsupport, the costs and benefits of anti-terrorism policies will be debated. Better information about terrorism and its consequences can improve policy outcome if there is electoral competition. Over the last few years, economic scholars have analysed the effects terrorist acts have on various aspects of the economy. The findings of these impact studies are summarised in this paper. They capture, however, only part of the overall utility losses.nHence, several approaches to value public goods and conceptual issues concerning their application to terrorismnare discussed. In particular, the hedonic market approach, the averting behaviour method, the contingent valuation method and vote and popularity functions are reviewed. Further, an exploratory analysis of estimating individuals' utility losses using life satisfaction or happiness data is presented. This paper also discusses ansubstantially different approach combining measurement and decision-making, namely popular referenda. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Re-evaluating an Evaluation Study: The Case of the German Health Care Reform of 1997, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 311, 2003. (Working Paper)
This paper reports on a re-evaluation of the German health care reform of 1997. A previous evaluation found a limited effect of a 4.4 percent reduction of the number of doctor visits in a sample of pharmacy customers. The re-evaluation based on a representative household survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel, yields a much larger effect. The paper uses this case study to discuss the methods and benefits of modern techniques of program evaluation. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Parental Separation and Well-Being of Youths, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 312, 2003. (Working Paper)
This paper uses recent data for Germany and a new outcome variable to assess the consequences of parental separation on the well-being of youths. In particular, it is considered how subjective well-being, elicited from an ordinal 11-point general life satisfaction question, differs between youths living in intact and non-intact families, holding many other potential determinants of well-being constant using ordered probit regressions. The main finding of this study is that living in a non-intact family has not the hypothesised large negative effect on child well-being. |
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David Dorn, Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Why is the employment rate of older Swiss so high? An analysis of the social security system, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 28 (4), 2003. (Journal Article)
Extracts of this paper were presented at the conference "Work Beyond 60: Preparing for the Demographic Shock", 6–7 March 2003 in Vienna organized by The Geneva Association, The Club of Rome, and The Risk Institute. Parts were also presented at the Bertelsmann Foundation conference "Strategien gegen den Fachkräftemangel" in Berlin, 2 July 2002 and at the Bertelsmann Foundation conference "Reformen zur Steigerung der Beschäftigungsfähigkeit älterer Arbeitskräfte" in Berlin, 26 October 2001. The authors would like to thank the participants as well as Jaap van Dam, Thomas Liebig, Fred Henneberger, and Geneviève Reday-Mulvey for their valuable comments and discussions. Alfonso Sousa-Poza would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for financial assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. |
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Hermann Garbers, Agents' Rationality and the CHF/USD Exchange Rate, Part II, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 169, 2003. (Working Paper)
In Part I the author was concerned with modeling the monthly logarithmicnCHF/USD exchange rate, ''s''. He rejected a model proposed by B.T.nMcCallum. Searching for a more appropriate framework a story by P. DenGrauwe was introduced, bringing complex cognitive processes and socialnpractices into the picture.nThis paper treats again P. De Grauwe's story, supplements it and embedds itninto a broader setting showing its links to a subtle concept of agents'nrationality. We derive a testable implication of this approach. Althoughnthe test result is negative, it will be helpful for the misspecificationnanalysis of B.T. McCallum's model (applied to ''s''), which will finally benpresented in Part III of this paper. |
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Hermann Garbers, Agents' Rationality and the CHF/USD Exchange Rate, Part I, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 163, 2003. (Working Paper)
The analysis of monthly exchange rates is carried out using a model of McCallum, which is based on the concept of Rational Expectations. Applying the model to the CHF/USD exchange rate starting a misspecification analysis, the RE component appears to be a weak point of the model. The theory of rational beliefs of M. Kurz generalizes the RE concept introducing special consideration of Data Generating Processes (DGP). We find, however, some evidence speaking against the rational belief approach (with respect to the CHF/USD exchange rate) which is related to regime switchings and the presence of unobserved variables in the data-generating process. It appears that the rationality of economic agents depends on complex cognitive processes not discussed by Kurz, but taken into account in a ''story'' by Paul De Grauwe. This story will be supplemented in Part II of the paper in order to eliminate the RE component and to proceed with the misspecification analysis of McCallum's model. |
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Armin Falk, Charitable Giving as a Gift Exchange - Evidence from a Field Experiment, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 168, 2003. (Working Paper)
This study reports data from a field experiment that was nconducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable ngiving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors nin the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third ncontained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a npotential donor received a letter with or without a gift was randomly ndetermined. We observe strong and systematic effects from including gifts. nCompared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations nincreased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for na large gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the ncharitable organization. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, nit shows that reciprocity is an important motive for charitable giving, in naddition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the paper confirms the economic nrelevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body nof research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to nlaboratory studies. |
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Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer, Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 167, 2003. (Working Paper)
"A crucial aspect of constitutional design is the provision of rules on how anconstitution is to be amended. If procedures for constitutional amendment are very restrictive,nchanges will take place outside the constitution. These changes are likely to be against thencitizens interests and their ability to influence the political process. We argue that thendevelopment of the constitution must be based on the rule of law. We propose directndemocratic rights that allow citizens to participate in the amendment process. The directndemocratic process of institutional change is theoretically and empirically analyzed. Annumber of counter arguments and issues for a gradual introduction are discussed." |
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