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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Oxford Economic Papers |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0030-7653 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Number | 3 |
| Page Range | 437 - 460 |
| Date | 2004 |
| Abstract Text | In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1093/oep/gpf050 |
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| Additional Information | The accepted manuscript is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Oxford Economic Papers, 56(3):437-460] is available online at: http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/3/437 |