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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Best-reply matching in games |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0165-4896 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Number | 3 |
| Page Range | 291 - 309 |
| Date | 2003 |
| Abstract Text | We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9 |
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| Keywords | Best reply, Matching, Equilibrium, Learning, Game theory, Bounded rationality |