Contributions in Merlin

This paper builds a two-country, two-sector (polluting, nonpolluting) trade model with directed technical change, examining whether unilateral environmental policies can ensure sustainable growth. The polluting good generates more or less emissions depending on its relative use of a clean and a dirty input. I show that a unilateral policy combining clean research subsidies and a trade tax can ensure sustainable growth, while unilateral carbon taxes alone increase innovation in the polluting sector abroad and generally cannot ensure sustainable growth. Relative to autarky and exogenous technical change respectively, the mechanisms of trade and directed technical change accelerate environmental degradation either under laissez-faire or with unilateral carbon taxes, yet both help reduce environmental degradation under the appropriate unilateral policy. I characterize the optimal unilateral policy analytically and numerically using calibrated simulations. Knowledge spillovers have the potential to reduce the otherwise large welfare costs of restricting policy to one country only.

The government is the biggest buyer in the economy of most countries. At the same time, the public procurement process if often thought to be fraught with corruption and malpractice. However, there is little evidence regarding the impact of audits aimed at reducing such malpractice. This paper investigates the effect of being audited on public entities' subsequent procurement practices in Chile. For identification, we exploit a scoring rule of the national auditing agency, which allows for regression discontinuity analysis. Our preliminary results show that the audits seem to lead to a temporary shift towards less transparent modalities of procurement. The share of the amount of total purchases through direct negotiations increases by around 20 percentage points, at the expense of the use of public auctions. The effect is most pronounced during months when the audit is taking place and disappears completely by the subsequent fiscal year. Since audits in Chile rarely happen in consecutive years, and since the audit typically only covers the most recent completed fiscal year, this time pattern of effects is consistent with public agents responding to a temporary drop in audit risk during the year of the audit.

A recent literature emphasizes the importance of the gender gap in willingness to compete as a partial explanation for gender differences in labor market outcomes. However, whereas experiments investigating willingness to compete typically do so in anonymous environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, we should expect public observability to further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment that varies whether the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. Across four different treatments, however, all treatment effects are close to zero. We conclude that the public observability of decisions and outcomes does not exert a gnificant impact on male or female willingness to compete, indicating that the role of social image concerns related to competitive decisions may be limited.

This paper evaluates the 2003 Austrian severance-pay reform, often advocated as a role model for structural reforms in countries plagued by inflexible labor markets and high unemployment. The reform replaced a system with tenure-based severance payments after a layoff (but not after a quit) by payments into pension accounts that accrue to workers after a layoff as well as after a quit. We identify the reform effects using a regression discontinuity (RD) design and find a substantial increase in job mobility in response to the reform. A search-and-matching model with on-the- job search and tenure-dependent severance payments is structurally estimated using the RD-induced empirical moments. Counterfactual policy experiments suggest that flexicurity reforms spur job creation and can substantially reduce unemployment in countries where severance payments are initially high.

Public attention has focused on how the launch of the national health exchanges could impact the types of risks who initially enroll and thereby affect future premiums and enrollment. We introduce simple dynamics into a standard model of insurance under adverse selection to show that such "initial conditions" can indeed matter. When firms are price-takers, the market can converge to a Pareto-inferior "bad" equilibrium if there are at least three equilibria, which we suggest has empirical support. Strategic pricing eliminates Pareto dominated equilibria but requires common knowledge of preference and risk distributions. Changing the fine on non-participants from a fixed amount to a fraction of equilibrium prices increases the range of initial conditions consistent with reaching the "good" equilibrium while reducing the "badness" of the bad equilibrium -- all without increasing the fine value in the good equilibrium. Allowing insurers to quickly change prices can encourage them to experiment with strategic pricing if market fundamentals are not perfectly known, increasing the chance of reaching the good equilibrium independently from initial conditions.

Second moments of asset returns are important for risk management and portfolio selection. The problem of estimating second moments can be approached from two angles: time series and the cross-section. In time series, the key is to account for conditional heteroskedasticity; a favored model is Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC), derived from the ARCH/GARCH family started by Engle (1982). In the cross-section, the key is to correct in-sample biases of sample covariance matrix eigenvalues; a favored model is nonlinear shrinkage, derived from Random Matrix Theory (RMT). The present paper marries these two strands of literature in order to deliver improved estimation of large dynamic covariance matrices.

The structure of marriage and child-rearing in U.S. households has undergone two marked shifts in the last three decades: a steep decline in the prevalence of marriage among young adults, and a sharp rise in the fraction of children born to unmarried mothers or living in single-headed households. A potential contributor to both phenomena is the declining labor-market opportunities faced by males, which make them less valuable as marital partners. We exploit large scale, plausibly exogenous labor-demand shocks stemming from rising international manufacturing competition to test how shifts in the supply of young ‘marriageable’ males affect marriage, fertility and children's living circumstances. Trade shocks to manufacturing industries have differentially negative impacts on the labor market prospects of men and degrade their marriage-market value along multiple dimensions: diminishing their relative earnings—particularly at the lower segment of the distribution—reducing their physical availability in trade-impacted labor markets, and increasing their participation in risky and damaging behaviors. As predicted by a simple model of marital decision-making under uncertainty, we document that adverse shocks to the supply of `marriageable' men reduce the prevalence of marriage and lower fertility but raise the fraction of children born to young and unwed mothers and living in in poor single-parent households. The falling marriage-market value of young men appears to be a quantitatively important contributor to the rising rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing and single-headed childrearing in the United States.

These days, it is common practice to base inference about the coefficients in a hetoskedastic linear model on the ordinary least squares estimator in conjunction with using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Even when the true form of heteroskedasticity is unknown, heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors can also used to base valid inference on a weighted least squares estimator and using such an estimator can provide large gains in efficiency over the ordinary least squares estimator. However, intervals based on asymptotic approximations with plug-in standard errors often have coverage that is below the nominal level, especially for small sample sizes. Similarly, tests can have null rejection probabilities that are above the nominal level. In this paper, it is shown that under unknown hereroskedasticy, a bootstrap approximation to the sampling distribution of the weighted least squares estimator is valid, which allows for inference with improved finite-sample properties. For testing linear constraints, permutations tests are proposed which are exact when the error distribution is symmetric and is asymptotically valid otherwise. Another concern that has discouraged the use of weighting is that the weighted least squares estimator may be less efficient than the ordinary least squares estimator when the model used to estimate the unknown form of the heteroskedasticity is misspecified. To address this problem, a new estimator is proposed that is asymptotically at least as efficient as both the ordinary and the weighted least squares estimator. Simulation studies demonstrate the attractive finite-sample properties of this new estimator as well as the improvements in performance realized by bootstrap confidence intervals.

We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.

Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.