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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Pay-as-bid: selling divisible goods |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | SSRN |
Number | 2417512 |
ISSN | 1556-5068 |
Number of Pages | 55 |
Date | 2016 |
Abstract Text | Pay-as-bid is the most popular auction format for selling treasury securities. We prove the uniqueness of pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pay-as-bid auctions where symmetrically-informed bidders face uncertain supply, and we establish a tight sufficient condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Equilibrium bids have a convenient separable representation: the bid for any unit is a weighted average of marginal values for larger quantities. With optimal supply and reserve price, the pay-as-bid auction is revenue-equivalent to the uniform-price auction. |
Free access at | DOI |
Official URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417512 |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.2417512 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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