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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | The cost of ordinality |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | SSRN |
Number | 2460511 |
ISSN | 1556-5068 |
Number of Pages | 4 |
Date | 2014 |
Abstract Text | School districts and other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers tend to rely on mechanisms that only elicit agents’ ordinal preferences. The present note shows that the welfare loss imposed by only eliciting ordinal preferences can be arbitrarily large. |
Free access at | DOI |
Official URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460511 |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.2460511 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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