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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Trading cycles for school choice |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | SSRN |
Number | 1899344 |
ISSN | 1556-5068 |
Number of Pages | 13 |
Date | 2011 |
Abstract Text | In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies. |
Official URL | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899344 |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.1899344 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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Keywords | Mechanism design, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, matching, house allocation, house exchange, outside options |