Alexander L Davis, Nadja R Jehli, John H Miller, Roberto A. Weber, Generosity across contexts, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 50, 2015. (Working Paper)
Extensive research in economics explores generosity in monetary allocations. However, generosity often involves the allocation of non-monetary goods or experiences. Existing evidence suggests that generosity may be higher in such contexts, though no direct comparison exists. Here, we compare generosity in decisions that vary whether allocations are monetary or non-monetary. In two experiments, generosity is significantly higher in non-monetary contexts. Thus, the typical monetary laboratory dictator game may underestimate generosity in many non-laboratory contexts where allocations are non-monetary. We find weaker relationships between individuals’ allocation decisions across monetary and non-monetary contexts than for allocations that hold constant the monetary nature of the context. |
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Gregori Baetschmann, Heterogeneity in the relationship between happiness and age: evidence from the German socio-economic panel, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 47, 2011. (Working Paper)
This paper studies the evolution of life satisfaction over the life course in Germany. It clarifies the causal interpretation of the econometric model by discussing the choice of control variables and the underidentification between age, cohort and time effects. The empirical part analyzes the distribution of life satisfaction over the life course at the aggregated, subgroup and individual level. To the findings: On average, life satisfaction is mildly decreasing up to age fifty-five followed by a hump shape with a maximum at seventy. The analysis at the lower levels suggests that people differ in their life satisfaction trends, whereas the hump shape after age fifty-five is robust. No important differences between men and women are found. In contrast, education groups differ in their trends: highly educated people become happier over the life cycle, where life satisfaction decreases for less educated people. |
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Gregori Baetschmann, Identification and estimation of thresholds in the fixed effects ordered logit model, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 46, 2011. (Working Paper)
The paper proposes a new estimator for the fixed effects ordered logit model. In contrast to existing methods, the new procedure allows estimating the thresholds. The empirical relevance and simplicity of implementation is illustrated in an application to the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction. |
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David Andolfatto, Aleksander Berentsen, Christopher Waller, Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 45, 2011. (Working Paper)
While both public and private financial agencies supply asset markets with large quantities of information, they do not necessarily disclose all asset-related information to the general public. This observation leads us to ask what principles might govern the optimal disclosure policy for an asset manager or financial regulator. To investigate this question, we study the properties of a dynamic economy endowed with a risky asset, and with individuals that lack commitment. Information relating to future asset returns is available to society at zero cost. Legislation dictates whether this information is to be made public or not. Given the nature of our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable. This result is overturned, however, when individuals are able to access hidden information—what we call undue diligence—at sufficiently low cost. Information disclosure is desirable, in other words, only in the event that individuals can easily discover it for themselves. |
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Nick Netzer, Armin Schmutzler, Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 0919, 2011. (Working Paper)
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative rather than positive emotions. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents the equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium without social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade. |
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Olivier Ledoit, Choice democracy, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 38, 2011. (Working Paper)
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world. |
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Christian Jonathan Kascha, Carsten Trenkler, Cointegrated VARMA Models and Forecasting US Interest Rates, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 33, 2011. (Working Paper)
We bring together some recent advances in the literature on vector autoregressive moving-average models creating a relatively simple specification and estimation strategy for the cointegrated case. We show that in the cointegrated case with fixed initial values there exists a so-called final moving representation which is usually simpler but not as parsimonious than the usual Echelon form. Furthermore, we proof that our specification strategy is consistent also in the case of cointegrated series. In order to show the potential usefulness of the method, we apply it to US interest rates and find that it generates forecasts superior to methods which do not allow for moving-average terms. |
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Andreas Blume, Peter H Kriss, Roberto A. Weber, Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 34, 2014. (Working Paper)
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small costs dramatically reduce message use, but efficient coordination of actions occurs with similar frequency to that observed under costless communication. Our results can be accounted for by Govindan and Wilson's formalization of forward induction (GW-FI), which selects, among the pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, the one in which efficiency is achieved without communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by forgoing the use of reasonably costly optional messages is substantial from the first period, is remarkably stable at that level, and is not significantly affected by learning. |
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Sebastian Kube, Michel Maréchal, Clemens Puppe, Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 471, 2011. (Working Paper)
Employment contracts are often incomplete, leaving many responsibilities subject to workers’ discretion. High work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms. We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity. Wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity, reducing average output by more than 20 percent. An equivalent wage increase, however, did not result in any productivity gains. The results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output, leaving enough room for positive reactions. Altogether, these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity, as opposed to inequality aversion. |
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Sebastian Findeisen, Dominik Sachs, Education and optimal dynamic taxation: The role of income-contingent student loans, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 40, 2012. (Working Paper)
We study Pareto optimal tax and education policies when human capital upon labor market entry is endogenous and individuals face wage uncertainty. Though optimal labor distortions are history-dependent, i.e. depend on income and education, simple policy instruments can yield the desired distortions: a single nonlinear labor income tax schedule combined with income-contingent loans. To take themodel to the (US) data, we simplify the model to a binary education decision (graduating from college or not). We find that for lowand intermediate incomes the labor supply decision of college graduates should be distorted more heavily than for individuals without a college degree. As a consequence, the optimal student loan repayment schedule increases in income for this range. This result holds along the Pareto frontier. We compare the second best to a situation where loan repayment is restricted to be independent from income and find significant welfare gains. |
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Ernst Fehr, Olive Hart, Christian Zehnder, How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 43, 2011. (Working Paper)
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in situations in which the parties do not use them. |
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Jo Thori Lind, Dominic Rohner, Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income, and welfare spending, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 36, 2011. (Working Paper)
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we fi*nd that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory. |
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Timothy C Salmon, Roberto A. Weber, Maintaining efficiency while integrating entrants from lower-performing groups: an experimental study, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 35, 2014. (Working Paper)
Efficiently growing a group or firm often requires integration of individuals from lower-performing entities. We explore the effectiveness of two policies intended to facilitate such integration, using a laboratory experiment that models production as a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We initially create an efficient group and an inefficient one. We then allow individuals to move into the high-performing group and vary by treatment whether movement is unrestricted, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two restrictions in different ways to help understand why the institutions are effective in maintaining coordination. We find that both restrictions work to maintain efficient coordination but they are effective for different reasons. |
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Rafael Lalive, Analía Schlosser, Andreas Steinhauer, Josef Zweimüller, Parental leave and mothers' careers: the relative importance of job protection and cash benefits, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 42, 2011. (Working Paper)
Parental leave regulations in most OECD countries have two key policy instruments: job protection and cash benefits. This paper studies how mothers’ return to work behavior and labor market outcomes are affected by alternative mixes of these key policy parameters. Exploiting a series of major parental leave policy changes in Austria, we find that longer cash benefits lead to a significant delay in return to work and that the magnitude of this effect depends on the relative length of job protection and cash benefits. However, despite their impact on time on leave, we do not find a significant effect on mothers’ labor market outcomes in the medium run, neither of benefit duration nor of job-protection duration. To understand the relative importance (and interaction) of the two policy instruments in shaping mothers’ return to work behavior, we set up a non-stationary job search model in which cash benefits and job protection determine decisions of when to return to work and whether or not to return to the pre-birth employer. Despite its lean structure, the model does surprisingly well in matching empirically observed return to work profiles. The simulation of alternative counterfactual regimes shows that a policy that combines both job protection and benefits payments succeeds to induce mothers to spend some time with the child after birth without jeopardizing their medium run labor market attachment. |
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Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive, Andreas Steinhauer, Josef Zweimüller, The Demand for Social Insurance: Does Culture Matter?, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 41, 2011. (Working Paper)
Can different social groups develop different demands for social insurance of risks to health and work? We study this issue across language groups in Switzerland. Language de*fines social groups and Swiss language groups are separated by a clear geographic border. Actual levels of social insurance are identical on either side of the within state segments of the language border. We can therefore study the role of culture in shaping the demand for social insurance. Specifically, we contrast at the language border actual voting decisions on country-wide changes to social insurance programs. Key results indicate substantially higher support for expansions of social insurance among residents of Latin-speaking (i.e. French, Italian, or Romansh) border municipalities compared to their German-speaking neighbors in adjacent municipalities. We consider three possible explanations for this finding: informal insurance, ideology, and the media. We find that informal insurance does not vary enough to explain stark differences in social insurance. However, di*fferences in ideology and segmented media markets are potentially important explanatory factors. |
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Olivier Ledoit, The redistributive effects of monetary policy, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 44, 2011. (Working Paper)
We introduce a model of the economy as a social network. Two agents are linked to the extent that they transact with each other. This generates well-defined topological notions of location, neighborhood and closeness. We investigate the implications of our model for monetary economics. When a central bank increases the money supply, it must inject the money somewhere in the economy. We demonstrate that the agent closest to the location where money is injected is better off, and the one furthest is worse off. This redistribution channel is independent from the ones previously noted in the literature. Symmetrically, any decrease in the money supply redistributes purchasing power in the other direction. We also outline the testable implications of our model. |
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Lasse Steiner, Lucian Schneider, The happy artist? An empirical application of the work-preference model, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 37, 2011. (Working Paper)
The artistic labor market is marked by several adversities, such as low wages, above-average unemployment, and constrained underemployment. Nevertheless, it attracts many young people. The number of students exceeds the available jobs by far. A potential explanation for this puzzle is that artistic work might result in exceptionally high job satisfaction, a conjecture that has been mentioned at various times in the literature. We conduct the first direct empirical investigation of artists’ job satisfaction. The analysis is based on panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP). Artists on average are found to be considerably more satisfied with their work than non-artists, a finding that corroborates the conjectures in the literature. Differences in income, working hours, and personality cannot account for the observed difference in job satisfaction. Partially, but not fully, the higher job satisfaction can be attributed to the higher self-employment rate among artists. Suggestive evidence is found that superior “procedural” characteristics of artistic work, such as increased variety and on-the-job learning, contribute to the difference in job satisfaction. |
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Andreas Hefti, Attention Competition, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 28, 2011. (Working Paper)
I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition are interdependent. On the one hand the effort to attract consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the firm which depends on the grade of price competition among all perceived firms. On the other hand attracting attention involves costs which must be covered by the earnings from competition. It is the task of this paper to clarify the consequences of such an interdependence between attention competition and economic competition for prices, attention effort and market structure as determined by the strategic equilibrium. Under limited attention the market as perceived by consumers and not the effective market is relevant to the firms which implies that prices also reflect the scarcity of attention. Less attentive consumers lead to higher prices but at the same time getting attention is more valuable which intensifies the competition for attention and leads to higher attention costs. I show that if attention competition is relatively inelastic or the commodities are strong substitutes then the gains from consumer inattention outweigh the costs of attracting attention which leads to higher profits and larger effective markets. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Conspicuous Consumption and Satisfaction, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 30, 2011. (Working Paper)
Traditional tools of welfare economics identify the envy-related welfare loss from conspicuous consumption only under very strong assumptions. Measured income and life satisfaction offers an alternative for estimating such consumption externalities. The approach is developed in the context of luxury car consumption (Ferraris and Porsches) in Switzerland. Results from household panel data and fixed effects panel regressions suggest that the prevalence of luxury cars in the municipality of residence has a negative impact on own income satisfaction. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Copula bivariate probit models: with an application to medical expenditures, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. No. 29, 2011. (Working Paper)
The bivariate probit model is frequently used for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary regressor (the "treatment") on a binary health outcome variable. This paper discusses simple modifications that maintain the probit assumption for the marginal distributions while introducing non-normal dependence using copulas. In an application of the copula bivariate probit model to the effect of insurance status on the absence of ambulatory health care expenditure, a model based on the Frank copula outperforms the standard bivariate probit model. |
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