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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Sebastian Kube
  • Michel Maréchal
  • Clemens Puppe
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 471
ISSN 1424-0459
Number of Pages 34
Date 2011
Abstract Text Employment contracts are often incomplete, leaving many responsibilities subject to workers’ discretion. High work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms. We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity. Wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity, reducing average output by more than 20 percent. An equivalent wage increase, however, did not result in any productivity gains. The results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output, leaving enough room for positive reactions. Altogether, these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity, as opposed to inequality aversion.
Official URL http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html
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Keywords morale, reciprocity, gift exchange, field experiment
Additional Information Revised version