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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Choice democracy |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | No. 38 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Date | 2011 |
| Abstract Text | Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp038.pdf |
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| Keywords | Democracy, choice, polyarchy, stability, competition, efficiency, Demokratie, Polyarchie, Wahlsystem, Politisches System |