Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 20, 1999. (Working Paper)
This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the standard self-interest model predicts that they should prefer the more complete contract. Our theoretical analysis shows that fairness concerns can explain this preference for less completeness. Fair principals keep their promises which provides strong pecuniary incentives through an incomplete contract. Selfish principals free-ride and exploit the agents. Counter-intuitively, selfish agents are induced to work by an incomplete contract while fair agents shirk. |
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Urs Fischbacher, z-Tree - Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments - Experimenter's Manual, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 21, 1999. (Working Paper)
"This manual explains the use of z-Tree, the ""Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments"". No programming knowledge is necessary to use z-Tree. This software allows to program and to conduct a wide range of experiments. This includes simultaneous and sequential games as well as market experiments and posted offer markets or double auctions. Because many features needed in an experimental software are built into z-Tree (as data saving, time and period display, profit calculation, group matching, provisions in case of losses and bankruptcy), new experiments can be developed quickly and easily." |
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Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, On the Nature of Fair Behavior, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 17, 1999. (Working Paper)
"This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not." |
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Ernst Fehr, K M Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114 (3), 1999. (Journal Article)
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior |
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Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer, Happiness, Economy and Institutions, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 15, 1999. (Working Paper)
"A cross-regional econometric analysis is conducted suggesting that institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and of federal structure (local autonomy) systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being. This positive effect can be attributed to political outcomes closer to voters preferences as well as to the procedural utility of political participation. Moreover, the results of ""standard"" microeconometric well-being functions previously published are supported. Unemployment among economic variables and bad health among demographic variables have a strongly depressing effect on happiness. Income only significantly raises happiness for higher income groups." |
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Bruno Frey, Art Fakes - What Fakes? An Economic View, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 14, 1999. (Working Paper)
"An economic analysis of fakes differs substantially from the legal and the art historic views which both tend to propose repressive policies against imitations. But there are large economic benefits from copying. In particular, the ""propagation effect"" yields utility to both consumers and creators of the original. In contrast, the harmful effects of fakes are small and are mitigated by emerging institutions (guarantees, sellers with reputation). The paper suggests ""art quotations"" (similar to academic quotations) as a beneficial solution to creators of originals and consumers. ""Art quotations"" are applicable to many art forms." |
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Stefan Felder, Reto Schleiniger, Environmental Tax Reform: Efficiency and Political Feasibility, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 13, 1999. (Working Paper)
Command-and-control measures, despite their inefficiencies, are still the standard in environmental policy. This might be due to the fact that command-and-control instruments prevent monetary redistribution between sectors and households and leave property rights on remaining pollution with the emittents. The present paper interprets the no-redistribution policy as a political constraint and investigates on more efficient alternatives to command-and-control, using a computable general equilibrium model for Switzerland. Simulation results render schemes that refund environmental tax revenues by a sector-by-sector-subsidy on labor or output as welfare enhancing. |
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Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran, Does Money Illusion Matter?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 12, 1999. (Working Paper)
"Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the adjustment process of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock in an experimental setting with strategic complementarity. We show that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff presentation cause large behavioral differences. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price stickiness and real effects are much more pronounced than when payoff information is presented in real terms. The driving force of differences in real outcomes is subjects expectation of higher nominal inertia in the nominal payoff condition. Due to strategic complementarity, these expectations induce subjects to adjust rather slowly to the shock." |
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Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 10, 1999. (Working Paper)
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats. |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Do Immigrants Displace Young Native Workers: The Austrian Experience, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 11, 1999. (Working Paper)
This paper studies the effect of increased immigration in Austria on the unemployment risk of young natives. Austria experienced a dramatic rise in the share of alien workers as a result of the breakdown of the former commu-nist regimes (especially from former Yugoslavia). We concentrate on unemployment entry of young male workers, who are supposed to compete most heavily with new immigrants. Our results indicate that the detrimental impact - if it exists at all - is only minor. This is irrespective of the analyzed proxy for competition: The share of foreign workers in an industry or in a region. |
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Maria Saez Marti, Jörgen W Weibull, Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 86 (2), 1999. (Journal Article)
In the models of Young (1993, Econometrica61, 57–84; 1993, J. Econ. Theory 59, 145–168), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (J. Econ. Theory 59, 145–168) bargaining model. It turns out that “cleverness” in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C70, C78. |
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Bruno Frey, Lorenz Goette, Does Pay Motivate Volunteers?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 7, 1999. (Working Paper)
Volunteer work is an increasingly large, yet ill-understood sector of the economy. We show that monetary rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation of volunteers. A unique data set from Switzerland allows us to assess the effects of financial rewards on the effort put into volunteer work. There is a fairly standard pattern regarding the volunteers reaction e.g. to more labor market work hours. But we obtain the puzzling result that, when rewarded, volunteers work less. These findings are in line with a large literature in social psychology emphasizing that external rewards can undermine the intrinsic motivation for an activity. We show the implications for public policy towards volunteering. |
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Josef Zweimüller, Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel's Law: The Impact of Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 9, 1999. (Working Paper)
This paper analyzes the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by innovations and consumers have hierarchic preferences. Inequality has an impact on growth because it affects the structure and the dynamics of demand. Redistribution from very rich to very poor consumers is beneficial for growth. In general, the growth effect depends on the nature of redistribution. Due to a demand externality of R&D activities multiple equilibria are possible. |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Intra-firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 8, 1999. (Working Paper)
Personnel economics has put forward conflicting arguments concerning the impact of increased wage dispersion within a firm on the productivity of its workers. Besides giving more incentives, bigger wage differentials might also give rise to less co-operation and more politicking amongst workers resulting in worse outcomes. We try to shed light on these issues using panel data for Austrian firms. As indicators for firm performance we use standardised wages. For white-collar wages the following picture emerges: more dispersion leads to higher earnings up to some point where the relation changes its direction. For blue-collar wages we find a positive association between dispersion and standardised wages between firms, but no relation within firms over time. |
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Marek Pycia, Marek G Pycia, A convolution inequality, Aequationes Mathematicae, Vol. 57 (2-3), 1999. (Journal Article)
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Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 4, 1999. (Working Paper)
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior. |
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Markus Knell, Social Comparisons, Inequality, and Growth, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 5, 1999. (Working Paper)
Over the recent years one could repeatedly hear the claim that a rising concern for relative standing (in terms of consumption) was partly responsible for the decline in household savings and in growth that could be observed in some developed countries (particularly in the US) and that the rise in income inequality had further aggravated this process. In this paper we want to analyze under which conditions (concerning the importance of social comparisons for peoples' behavior and their choice of reference groups) this claim is valid. We show that an increase in a societies' concern for relative standing aggravates a negative impact of inequality on growth if two conditions are fulfilled: individuals have a higher concern for their present than for their future relative standing and individuals have a tendency to find their reference groups among people that are wealthier then they are themselves. Empirical data suggest that the negative impact of inequality on growth is stronger in highly developed economies. This is compatible with the explanation that is presented in this paper if individuals living in highly developed countries are more likely to have a high concern for relative standing. We will argue (using research on the cultural consequences of economic development) that this is a reasonable assumption to make. |
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Josef Falkinger, Social instability and redistribution of income, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 15 (1), 1999. (Journal Article)
Rational agents can express discontent with a given distribution of income by threatening to disrupt an economy, if such a threat is profitable. This paper describes such circumstances in a two-class model. Social stability constraints define the acceptable set of income distributions, the range of which is determined by the extent to which income-generating abilities are vulnerable to disruption. Opportunities for disruption vary across stages of economic development. There is possibly no stable distribution in a low developed economy, whereas in an advanced economy, characterized by complex and interdependent production, stable distributions exist. This distinction provides a basis for the observed increasing significance of social stabilization by redistributive policy in the course of economic development. |
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Bruno Frey, Marcel Kucher, History as Reflected in Capital Markets: The Case of World War II, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 2, 1999. (Working Paper)
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. Looking at government bond prices of five European countries traded on the Swiss stock exchange during WWII provides a useful way of interpreting the importance attributed to various war events. We direct our attention to value changes in government bonds of five different nations: On the side of the Axis, Germany and Austria; on the side of the Allies, France; and the two neutral countries Belgium and Switzerland. The econometric analysis reveals that some events that are generally considered crucial are clearly reflected in government bond prices of the countries considered. This holds, in particular, for the official outbreak of the war in July to September 1939 (which sent down the government bond values not only of Austria, Belgium and France but also of Germany) and for losses and gains of national sovereignty." |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Firm Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland: Evidence from Job Changers, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 1, 1999. (Working Paper)
Using information on job changes and search behavior of workers and controlling for endogenousnmobility we study firm-size wage differentials in Switzerland. We find that the observed crosssectionalnfirm size premium cannot be explained exclusively by worker heterogeneity. Almost 50n% of the cross-section differential is a firm-size effect. |
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