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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Armin Falk
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Urs Fischbacher
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 17
ISSN 1424-0459
Date 1999
Abstract Text "This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players’ fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not."
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