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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Collateralization, bank loan rates, and monitoring
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Geraldo Cerqueiro
  • Steven Ongena
  • Kasper Roszbach
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Finance
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0022-1082
Volume 71
Number 3
Page Range 1295 - 1322
Date 2016
Abstract Text We show that collateral plays an important role in the design of debt contracts, the provision of credit, and the incentives of lenders to monitor borrowers. Using a unique data set from a large bank containing timely assessments of collateral values, we find that the bank responded to a legal reform that exogenously reduced collateral values by increasing interest rates, tightening credit limits, and reducing the intensity of its monitoring of borrowers and collateral, spurring borrower delinquency on outstanding claims. We thus explain why banks are senior lenders and quantify the value of claimant priority.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1111/jofi.12214
Other Identification Number merlin-id:9198
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