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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | The 1/d law of giving |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Publisher | American Economic Association |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1945-7669 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 183 - 203 |
| Date | 2010 |
| Abstract Text | We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance - giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics play a minor role in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for network formation. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior - students connect to others similar to them. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference for cliques - students connect to those already close. The study is one of the first to identify network architecture with individual behavior in a strategic context. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1257/mic.2.1.183 |
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