Contributions in Merlin

This paper presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic choice under risk. In this model, when it comes to choosing one lottery over another, each alternative has a chance of being selected, unless one lottery stochastically dominates the other. An individual behaves as if he compares lotteries to a reference lottery—a least upper bound or a greatest lower boundnin terms of weak dominance. The proposed model is compatible with several well-known violations of expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect and the violations of the betweenness. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the proposed model are completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity, common consequence independence,noutcome monotonicity, and odds ratio independence.

Risk aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of risk aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they may choose in a probabilistic manner. The paper considers comparative risk aversion within neoclassical expected utility theory, a constant error/tremble model and a strong utility model of probabilistic choice (which includes the Fechner model and the Luce choice model as special cases). The paper also provides a new definition of relative riskiness of lotteries.

This paper deals with the compensation for non-fatal accident risk in Switzerland and presents empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury. We approach the problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different accident risks based on unobserved productivity differences twofold. First, we have access to the number of accidents not only at the level of industries, but within cells defined over industry x skill-level of the job, which allows us to estimate risk compensation within groups of workers defined over the same cells. Second, we capitalize on the partial panel structure of our data which allows us to empirically isolate the wage component specific to the employer. Our different approaches to identification in fact yield very different estimates of the value of a statistical injury. Our preferred estimate gives an estimate of about 40,000 Swiss francs (per prevented injury pernyear).

This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices,ninflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guardnagainst financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited.

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments, both theoretically and empirically. We argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation, and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. Our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter, namely, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover, while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare, the second is instead optimal. In the empirical part of the paper, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants. Consistently with the terms of trade externality channel, we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

This study compares the performance of Prospect Theory versus Stochastic Expected Utility Theory at fitting data on decision making under risk. Both theories incorporate well-known deviations from Expected Utility Maximization such as the Allais paradox or the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Stochastic Expected Utility Theory parsimoniously extends the standard microeconomic model, whereas Prospect Theory, the benchmark for aggregate choice so far, is based on psychological findings. First, the two theories' fit to representative choice is assessed for two experimental data sets, one Swiss and one Chinese. In a second step, finite mixture regressions reveal a consistent mix of two different behavioral types suggesting that researchers may take individual heterogeneity into account in order to avoid aggregation bias.

Discrete-choice experiments, while becoming increasingly popular, have rarely been tested for validity and reliability. This contribution purports to provide some evidence of a rather unique type. Two surveys designed to measure willingness-to-accept (WTA) for reform options in Swiss health care and health insurance are used to provide independent information with regard to two elements of reform. The issue to be addressed is whether WTA values converge although the three overlapping attributes (a more restrictive drug benefit, a delayed access to medical innovation, and a change in the monthly insurance premium) are embedded in widely differing choice sets. Experiment A contains rather radical health system reform options, while experiment B concentrates on more familiar elements such as copayment and the benefit catalogue. While mean WTA values differ between experiments, they tend to vary in similar ways, suggesting at least theoretical validity and reliability.

This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions tonprovide the public good and to sanction free-riders. In this mechanism players commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage.nIf there is universal commitment, deposits are immediately refunded whenever anplayer contributes her speci¯ed share to the public good. If there is no universalncommitment, all deposits are refunded and the standard game is played. For suitable deposits, prior commitment and full ex post contributions are supported as a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the resulting game. As the mechanism obviates the need for any ex post prosecution of free-riders, it is particularlynsuited for situations where players do not submit to a common authority as in the case of international agreements.

Awards in the form of orders, decorations, prizes, and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit, and profit-oriented firms. This paper argues that awards present a unique combination of different stimuli and that they are distinct and unlike other monetary and non-monetary rewards. Despite their relevance in all areas of life awards have not received much scientific attention. We propose to study awards and present results on a vignette experiment that quantifies andnisolates the effects of different award characteristics such as the publicity associated with winning an award. Further, employing a unique data set, we demonstrate that there are substantial differences in the intensity of usage of awards across countries.

Seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre hat die neue Wachstumstheorie verstärkt Aufmerksamkeit auf Humankapital als eine Quelle des Wirtschaftswachstumsngelenkt. Neuere empirische Ergebnisse weisen allerdings darauf hin, dass Bildungsinvestitionen nur geringe soziale Externalitäten erzeugen und dass der direkte Beitrag des Humankapitals zum Wirtschaftswachstum relativngering ist. In dieser Arbeit wird der Beitrag des Humankapitals zur Wirtschaftsentwicklungnim Rahmen der langfristigen Wachstumstheorie dargestellt,nderen Gegenstand ist, den Übergang von Ländern von vor-industrieller Stagnation zu stetigem Wirtschaftswachstum zu erklären. Hier erweist sich,ndass Humankapital nicht nur direkte Produktivitätseffekte erzeugt, sondern auch als Auslöser verschiedener entwicklungsfördernder politischer Reformen dienen kann.