Contributions in Merlin

Despite the importance of gathering technological knowledge from external sources, many firms are not well-placed to collect information from beyond their own boundaries. Government policies designed to improve access to technological knowledge often encourage firms to develop strong ties with competitors, suppliers or customers. But although strong ties are valuable, especially when tacit knowledge needs to be communicated, firms in individualistic cultures may resist entering into close relationships with other firms. As a result, policies that encourage such firms to form weak ties may be a more effective way of promoting the spread of technological knowledge in individualistic cultures. In this paper, we develop a set of propositions concerning the suitability of strong and weak ties in cultures that are relatively more individualistic or collectivist. Our arguments are illustrated with survey data from Australia and Finland. In the final section, we make some policy recommendations for improving the diffusion of technological knowledge among firms in individualist cultures.

Learning and increased innovation are often mentioned as some of the key benefits from corporate venturing for corporations. However, little research exists that would analyze whether there are systematic differences in learning outcomes across different governance modes. In this paper, we systematically analyze how the governance choice between different external corporate venturing modes (i.e. corporate venture capital investments, alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions) influences the learning outcomes from corporate venturing. Based on learning theory, we develop hypotheses predicting how the characteristics of these governance modes affect learning outcomes in the corporation.

Individual-based models of schooling in fish have demonstrated that, via processes of self-organization, artificial fish may school in the absence of a leader or external stimuli, using local information only. We study for the first time how body size and body form of artificial fish affect school formation in such a model. For a variety of group sizes we describe how school characteristics (i.e., group form, spread, density, polarization, turning rate, and speed) depend on body characteristics. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the nearest neighbor distance and turning rate of individuals are different for different regions in the group, although the agents are completely identical. Our approach shows the significance of both self-organization and embodiment in modeling of schools of artificial fish and, probably, in structuring schools of real fish.

We consider an infinite-horizon exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral constraints. As in the two-period model of Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), households can default on their liabilities at any time, and financial securities are only traded if the promises associated with these securities are backed by collateral. We examine an economy with a single perishable consumption good, where the only collateral available consists of productive assets. In this model, competitive equilibria always exist and we show that, under the assumption that all exogenous variables follow a Markov chain, there also exist stationary equilibria. These equilibria can be characterized by a mapping from the exogenous shock and the current distribution of financial wealth to prices and portfolio choices. We develop an algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically and discuss ways to implement the algorithm in practice. A computational example demonstrates the performance of the algorithm and shows some quantitative features of equilibria in a model with collateral and default.

This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory permit market with auctioning, including the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposed design of tying the penalty rate to the auction price. Compliance strategies are limited to undertaking irreversible abatement investment decisions or buying permits. We aim to assess how penalty design under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences might affect compliance incentives, permit price discovery, and efficiency. In contrast to theory, we find that penalty levels serve as a focal point that indicates compliance costs and affects compliance strategies. The make-good provision penalty provides stronger compliance incentives than the other penalty types. However, the theory holds with regard to permit price discovery, as we find no evidence of the effect of penalty design on auction price. Interestingly, risk preference does not directly affect compliance decision, but it does influence price discovery, which evidently is a significant factor in compliance decisions as well as efficiency. Most importantly, a trade-off between investment incentives and efficiency is observed.

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusions of verbal communication generates both a larger effect and one that is robust across both inter-subject and intra-subject comparisons. In all conditions, trustors earn more when they invest more of their endowment, trustors and trustees gravitate to \"fair and efficient\" interactions, and the majority of trustees adhere to their commitments, whether explicit or implicit. Finally, we study trusting and trustworthiness in the sense of adhering to agreements, and we find that both are enhanced when the parties can use words, and especially when an agreement is reached with words and not only with the exchange of numerical proposals.