Contributions published at Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.

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In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757–770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort and inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we show that with optimally designed contracts, which we term integrity contracts, the worker will both exert effort and report his information truthfully, and hence the first best can be achieved.

We show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.

Michael Porter and others have recently argued that suitable environmental regulations are likely to induce cost-reducing innovations. We analyze under which conditions such arguments might be consistent with microeconomic analysis, and under which additional conditions the firms' benefits might exceed the costs. It turns out that this requires fairly specific conditions.

We present a model in which workers must be educated to get a good job and firms must innovate in order to increase productivity. Education as well as innovation and production require skilled labor as inputs. This, together with the fact that learning opportunities differ across workers, determine simultaneously the long-run level of skilled employment and the long-run rate of growth. We study the impact of changes in the factors which affect the education of workers and the incentives to innovate, and discuss the growth and employment effects of labor market policy measures.

The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

This paper analyzes the dependence of average consumption on the saving rate in a one-sector neoclassical Solow growth model with production shocks and stochastic rates of population growth and depreciation where arbitrary ergodic processes are considered. The long-run behavior of the stochastic capital intensity and hence average consumption is uniquely determined by a random fixed point which depends continuously on the saving rate. We prove existence of a golden rule saving rate maximizing average consumption per capita. A dynamic inefficiency result is given to ascertain the importance of the golden rule for the stochastic Solow model. The cases of Cobb-Douglas and CES production function are analyzed numerically, revealing that shocks to either parameter can lead to higher average consumption at the golden rule saving rate.

According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two elements. The two opposing propositions are tested using a large survey data set from Switzerland. The results suggest that power positions do not yield higher compensation. Rather, there is a non-positive relationship between power position and compensation, if one takes into account all relevant factors influencing total compensation.

This present paper analyzes an energy tax reform that exempts the energy-intensive export sector from paying the energy tax and uses the additional revenue to cut existing taxes in all sectors. To that end, a two sector two factor model of an open economy that is small on the import side but not on the export side is applied. Within this model, an equivalence between a tax reform with and without exemption of the export sector is derived. The equivalence occurs because in both tax schemes the tax burden is shifted through an increasing producer price of labor from the domestic to the foreign household.

This paper analyzes economic fluctuations in an overlapping generations economy with productive capital in which random shocks in aggregate productivity are present. Under specific assumptions we obtain an explicit solution of the model. Applying random dynamical systems theory, we can prove that the long-run behavior of the economy is uniquely described by an asymptotically stable random fixed point. The statistical properties of the aggregates output, consumption, capital stock, and real wage are investigated numerically. We find that our artificial economy displays several real world business cycle phenomena.nn

Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct democracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the political process itself.

We consider a three-location duopoly model such that (i) firms choose production and innovation locations before (Bertrand) competition takes place and (ii) there are internal and external knowledge spillovers. We show: (1) agglomerations where firms earn negative profits may exist when there are both external and internal knowledge spillovers; (2) greater external spillovers do not necessarily favor agglomeration; (3) decreasing communication costs tend to favor agglomeration; (4) there are exactly two types of agglomeration equilibria: either both firms innovate in the agglomeration, or there is an innovator and an imitator; and (5) if there is a location where both firms produce, then innovation must take place in this location.

"Due to its formality and highly analytic thinking, economics is often attributed a leading role among the social sciences and a prominent position as contributor to economic or social issues in the real world. Fact is, however, that the empirical proof for such a claim is either missing or anecdotal. This paper aims to outline the ""economics of economics”. It surveys and compares approaches of impact measurement such as a production function of economics or the demand and supply of trained economists. It furthermore discriminates between the impact of economicnideas versus that of economists as scientists or politicians."

"The measurement of individual happiness challenges the notion that revealed preferences only reliably reflect individual utility. Reported subjective well-being is a broader concept than traditional decision utility; it also includes concepts like experience and procedural utility. Micro- and macroeconometric happiness functions offer new insights on determinants of life satisfaction. However, one should not leap to the conclusion that happiness should be maximized in the sense of social welfare function maximization. In contrast, happiness research strengthens the validity of an institutional approach such as reflected in the theory of democratic economic policy."

This paper analyzes a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. It incorporates the following models as special cases: incremental investment, patent races, learning-by-doing, and network externalities. We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through further cost-reducing or quality-improving investments. In many commonly-studied oligopoly games, such investments are strategic substitutes. We derive a new comparative statics result that applies to games with strategic substitutes, and we use the result to derive conditions under which leading firms invest more than lagging firms. We show that the conditions are satisfied in a variety of commonly-studied oligopoly models. We also highlight plausible countervailing effects from two distinct sources. First, leading firms may find it more costly than others to achieve the same increment to their state. This force is particularly salient inmany models of patentn races, where firms make research investments in an attempt to find a new technology that delivers a given level of cost or quality. Second, countervailing effects may arise in dynamic games with more than two firms are sufficiently patient.

Die direkte Demokratie ist in den Kantonen der Schweiz unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägt. Die Beteiligung der Bürger im politischen Prozess via Verfassungs- und Gesetzesinitiative, Gesetzesreferendum und Finanzreferendum ist durch verschieden hohe Hürden eingeschränkt. Unterschiede bestehen beispielsweise bei der Anzahl Unterschriften, die verlangt werden, um ein Instrument zu ergreifen, der Zeit, welche für die Sammlung der Unterschriften zur Verfügung steht, oder der Ausgabenhöhe, ab welcher ein Finanzreferendum möglich ist. Diese Unterschiede werden verwendet, um Indizes für die direktdemokratischen Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten der Bürger zu berechnen. Die Indizes öffnen ein weites Feld für die institutionell vergleichende Forschung in der Schweiz.

Die Verhandlungen innerhalb der OECD zu einem multilateralen Abkommen ueber Investitionen (MAI) sind gescheitert. Damit werden Direktinvestitionen gegenwaertig weiterhin durch bilaterale Vertraege und durch einige wenige multilaterale Abkommen geregelt. In Zukunft ist jedoch weiterhin damit zu rechnen, daß diese durch ein allgemeines Rahmenwerk nach Vorlage des MAI ersetzt werden. Der vorliegende Aufsatz erlaeutert zunaechst die bestehenden multilateralen Rahmenbedingungen der WTO und der OECD. Anschließend werden die wesentlichen Inhalte des Vertragsentwurfs zum MAI vorgestellt und aus oekonomischer Sicht diskutiert. Ich komme zu der Einschaetzung, daß in einem zukuenftigen Investitionsabkommen (i) wettbewerbspolitische Inhalte, (ii) Ausnahmeregeln in bezug auf wenig industrialisierte Laender und (iii) ein differenzierter Investitionsbegriff enthalten sein sollten. Als Forum fuer ein multilaterales Investitionsabkommen bietet sich die WTO an.

This paper studies the relationship between health care expenditure (HCE) and age, using longitudinal rather than cross-sectional data. The econometric analysis of HCE in the last eight quarters of life of individuals who died during the period 1983-1992 indicates that HCE depends on remaining lifetime but not on calendar age, at least beyond 65+. The positive relationship between age and HCE observed in cross-sectional data may be caused by the simple fact that at age 80, for example, there are many more individuals living in their last 2 years than at age 65. The limited impact of age on HCE suggests that population ageing may contribute much less to future growth of the health care sector than claimed by most observers.