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Type | Journal Article |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: experimental evidence |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Item Subtype | Original Work |
Refereed | Yes |
Status | Published in final form |
Language |
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Journal Title | American Economic Review |
Publisher | American Economic Association |
Geographical Reach | international |
ISSN | 0002-8282 |
Volume | 90 |
Number | 1 |
Page Range | 247 - 264 |
Date | 2000 |
Abstract Text | The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary. |
Official URL | http://www.jstor.org/stable/117291 |
Related URLs | |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.1257/aer.90.1.247 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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Additional Information | Copyright: American Economic Association |