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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: experimental evidence
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Josef Falkinger
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Simon Gächter
  • Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title American Economic Review
Publisher American Economic Association
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0002-8282
Volume 90
Number 1
Page Range 247 - 264
Date 2000
Abstract Text The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.
Official URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/117291
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1257/aer.90.1.247
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Additional Information Copyright: American Economic Association