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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Belief precision and effort incentives in promotion contests |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Economic Journal |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0013-0133 |
| Volume | 125 |
| Number | 589 |
| Page Range | 1952 - 1963 |
| Date | 2015 |
| Abstract Text | The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmstrom, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/ecoj.12162 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:9946 |
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