Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Journal of Economics |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0931-8658 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 55 - 67 |
| Date | 1991 |
| Abstract Text | This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields. |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1007/BF01227455 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|