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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Efficient private provision of public goods when by rewarding deviations from average
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Josef Falkinger
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Public Economics
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0047-2727
Volume 62
Number 3
Page Range 413 - 422
Date 1996
Abstract Text This paper proposes the following incentive scheme for the private provision of public goods: government should reward and penalize deviations from the mean contribution by an appropriate factor. This makes efficient contribution individually rational even if individuals see through the government budget constraint.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01549-3,
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