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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidencefrom Swedish Treasury Auctions |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | The Journal of Political Economy |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-3808 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Number | 2 |
| Page Range | 394 - 424 |
| Date | 2002 |
| Abstract Text | We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1086/338748 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:6929 |
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