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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Optimal rules for patent races |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | International Economic Review |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0020-6598 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 23 - 52 |
| Date | 2012 |
| Abstract Text | There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators. |
| Free access at | DOI |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00670.x |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:6825 |
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