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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of International Economics |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-1996 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 65 - 72 |
| Date | 2011 |
| Abstract Text | Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. The conventional view is that the domestic financial turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation, although there is no clear empirical evidence on "classic" default penalties. This paper emphasizes instead a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises, building on two natural assumptions: (i) government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector; (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default. In this context, external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties and government default is counter cyclical, triggers a liquidity crunch, and amplifies output volatility. In addition, a financial reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately-sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting government's access to foreign credit. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.02.001 |
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