Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Conference or Workshop Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Published in Proceedings | Yes |
| Title | Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Enhanced Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks |
| Organization Unit |
|
| Authors |
|
| Presentation Type | paper |
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Event Title | Proceedings of the Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation (NetEcon) |
| Event Type | workshop |
| Event Location | Seattle, WA |
| Event Start Date | August 22 - 2008 |
| Event End Date | August 22 - 2008 |
| Place of Publication | Seattle, WA |
| Abstract Text | We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self- interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or other- wise decline to share its data. The problem is one of inter- dependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves effi- cient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compat- ibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents. |
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|