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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion
Organization Unit	Information Economics and Contract Theory (Christian Ewerhart)
Authors	Christian Ewerhart Philipp Wichardt
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number	No. 189
ISSN	1424-0459
Date	2004
Abstract Text	A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.
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