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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers - Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Christian Ewerhart
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 203
ISSN 1424-0459
Date 2004
Abstract Text The paper analyzes the infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game between agents with inequity-averse preferences. Without prior investments,nthe model predicts a shift of the outcome towards equal division. Asymmetricninvestments affect the ex-post bargaining outcome, giving an advantage to the party that contributed more. Under suitable circumstances, this effectnmay significantly mitigate the hold-up problem. In fact, in a symmetric setup, if production is sufficiently profitable, and parties are sufficiently patient, then the first-best investment levels can be approximated without a con
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