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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Asymmetric Vertical Integration
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Stefan Buehler
  • Armin Schmutzler
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Number No. 306
Date 2004
Abstract Text We examine vertical backward integration in a reducedform model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs.
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