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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 215 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2004 |
Abstract Text | "This paper extends the convergence result on Bayesian learning in Kalai and Lehrern(1993a, 1993b) to a class of games where players have a payoff function continuous for the product topology. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and 3) prior beliefs other players’ strategies have a grain of truth, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium. Those assumptions are shown to be tight." |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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