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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
Organization Unit	Microeconomics and Experimental Economic Research (Ernst Fehr)
Authors	Ernst Fehr Susanne Kremhelmer Klaus M Schmidt
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number	No. 224
ISSN	1424-0459
Date	2005
Abstract Text	We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
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