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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| Number | No. 255 |
| ISSN | 1424-0459 |
| Date | 2005 |
| Abstract Text | I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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