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Contribution Details
| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| Number | No. 238 |
| ISSN | 1424-0459 |
| Date | 2005 |
| Abstract Text | In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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