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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Introducing Social Norms in Game Theory |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| Number | No. 292 |
| ISSN | 1424-0459 |
| Date | 2006 |
| Abstract Text | This paper explicitly introduces norms in games, assuming that they shape (some) players’ utility and beliefs. People feel badly when they deviate from anbinding norm, and the less other players deviate, the more badly they feel.nFurther, people anger at transgressors and get pleasure from punishing them. Inthen study how social norms and emotions affect cooperation, coordination, and punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundantnexperimental evidence that alternative models of social preferences cannotnexplain. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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