Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Language |
|
Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute |
Number | No. 601 |
Date | 2008 |
Abstract Text | Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration satisfy the strategic-complementarity property, I obtain predictions for the direction of adjustment in response to parameter changes which do not require calculation of the quilibrium. I show that these predictions explain the experimental evidence very well. Further, I provide a behavioral justification of the approach, and I explore the relation to alternative explanations based on equilibrium selection theories and the quantal response equilibrium. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA) |