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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Philipp C Wichardt
  • Daniel Schunk
  • Patrick W Schmitz
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number No. 398
ISSN 1424-0459
Date 2008
Abstract Text This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
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