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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 438 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2009 |
Abstract Text | We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). When deliberation is prohibited, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous)nsequencing. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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