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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Rent-seeking contests with independent private values |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 490 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2010 |
Abstract Text | We consider symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent private valuations of the contest prize. For a two-parameter specification with continuous types, we fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, and study its basic properties. The willingness to waste is a hump-shaped function of the private valuation, with the median type expending the highest share of her valuation. A first-order (second-order) stochastic increase in the common type distribution raises (lowers) ex-ante expected efforts. However, neither first-order nor second-order stochastic dominance in valuations necessarily leads to a first-order stochastic dominance ranking in efforts. We also show that, as uncertainty vanishes, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium of the model with complete information. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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