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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Organization Unit	Organizational Design
Authors	Peter Coles Alexey Kushnir Muriel Niederle
Contributors	Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir and Muriel Niederle
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Number	No. 508
ISSN	1424-0459
Date	2010
Abstract Text	Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.
Official URL	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html
Related URLs	https://www.zora.uzh.ch/66230/
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