Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Public Good Provision in a Federalist Country: Tiebout Competition, Fiscal Equalization, and Incentives for Efficiency in Switzerland |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Language |
|
| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute |
| Number | No. 804 |
| Date | 2010 |
| Abstract Text | The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef- ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However, substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform is likely to enhance cantonal performance. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|