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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Franziska Barmettler
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Christian Zehnder
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number No. 27
ISSN 1664-7041
Date 2011
Abstract Text Social preference research has received considerable attention in recent years. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with other-regarding preferences can have important implications in many economic dimensions. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it dificult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our data reveals that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity has only minor, insignificant, effects on prosocial behavior.
Official URL http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp027.pdf
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Keywords Scrutiny, anonymity, laboratory experiments, prosocial behavior, Experiment, Sozialverhalten, prosoziales Verhalten