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| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | The Amsterdam Auction |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Journal Title | Econometrica |
| Publisher | The Econometric Society |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| Volume | 72 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 281 - 294 |
| Date | 2004 |
| Abstract Text | The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiments, we compare the standard first-price and English auctions, the optimal auction, and two variants of the Amsterdam auction. With strongly asymmetric bidders, the second-price Amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction. |
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