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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Taming systemically important financial institutions |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-2879 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Number | s1 |
| Page Range | 37 - 58 |
| Date | 2013 |
| Abstract Text | We model a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) that is too big (or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision, the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a Systemic Risk Authority endowed with special resolution powers, including the control of bankers' compensation packages during crisis periods. |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/jmcb.12036 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:4385 |
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