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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Magazine Industry
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Julian Wright
  • Ulrich Kaiser
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title International Journal of Industrial Organization
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0167-7187
Page Range 1 - 28
Date 2006
Abstract Text We present and estimate a model of competition in a two-sided market: the market for magazine readership and advertising. Using data on magazines in Germany, we find evidence that magazines have properties of two-sided markets. The results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are ‘subsidized’ and that magazines make all their money from advertisers. Consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements, our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates, but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.06.002
Other Identification Number merlin-id:3595
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