Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0165-4896 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Page Range | 52 - 59 |
| Date | 2024 |
| Abstract Text | The Riemann hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In the present paper, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH is true, then any game in the family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family of games. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.007 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Statistics, probability and uncertainty, general psychology, general social sciences, sociology and political science, Riemann hypothesis, Nash equilibrium, Pólya frequency functions |